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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Margaret Lewis entered into a conditional plea of guilty to felony driving under the
influence, specifically reserving the right to challenge, on appeal, the district court's
denial of her motion to suppress the State's evidence in her case.

Ms. Lewis' sole

challenge regarding her motion to suppress was limited to whether there was
reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the initial traffic stop, which was justified by
the State on the grounds that the officer who pulled Ms. Lewis over observed her
vehicle cross onto or over the fog line on the roadway several times. Mindful of the fact
that crossing onto or over the fog line on a roadway constitutes a traffic offense,
Ms. Lewis nevertheless asserts that the district court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Margaret Lewis was charged with felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.3537.) She thereafter filed a motion to suppress the State's evidence, alleging that the
stop itself, and all of the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, were the result of a
violation of her constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, and Article I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.54-55.)
At the hearing on Ms. Lewis' motion to suppress, the State called Deputy Matt
Lovell to testify. (Tr., p.5, Ls.9-19.) Deputy Lovell was the officer who pulled Ms. Lewis
over on the night of the charged offense.

(Tr., p.8, Ls.2-22.)

According to his

testimony, he was following Ms. Lewis' car because he had observed her weaving
within her own lane of travel on the road, and then saw her pull her car off to the side of
1

the road.

(Tr., p.10, Ls.2-9.) The officer then stopped his car behind Ms. Lewis to

execute what he characterized as, "a welfare check on the subjects." (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-9.)
As Deputy Lovell got out of his vehicle, he saw Ms. Lewis extend her arm out of
the window of the car. (Tr., p.12, Ls.13-18.) Ms. Lewis also turned on her turn signal
and pulled back onto the road. (Tr., p.13, Ls.1-3.) The deputy got back into his car and
followed Ms. Lewis based upon his belief that it was "not that typical" for a vehicle to
temporarily pull over to the side of the road.

(Tr., p.14, Ls.10-16.) At that time, the

officer did not stop Ms. Lewis' vehicle, but merely continued to follow her down the road.
(Tr., p.14, L.24 - p.15, L.6.)
According to the deputy, he saw Ms. Lewis' car cross very slightly over the fog
line on the road - and that her tire only crossed this line by "maybe an inch." (Tr., p.15,
Ls.7-25.) At a later point, her tire actually went across the fog line. (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-25.)
Deputy Lovell then initiated a traffic stop.

(Tr., p.17, Ls.1-3.)

During the officer's

testimony, the State also played a video recording of the traffic stop. (Tr., p.20, L.17 p.27, L.6.) This video recording did not clearly show how far Ms. Lewis' vehicle crossed
the fog line on the road. (State's Exhibit 1.) However, the officer tried to explain this
fact away by stating that the glare off of his windshield prevented the camera from being
able to capture Ms. Lewis' position on the road, and that his eyesight was better at
discerning her car's position. (Tr., p.25, L.7 - p.27, L.6.)
On cross-examination, Deputy Lovell admitted that it was fairly common for
drivers - during warm, summer nights such as the one on which Ms. Lewis was stopped
- to extend their hands or arms out of their windows, and that he had done so himself in
the past. (Tr., p.39, L.13 - p.40, L.12.) He also admitted that it was commonplace for
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drivers who are intending to make a right-hand turn to drift slightly to that direction in
their lane of travel prior to the turn. (Tr., p.40, Ls.17-24.)
Deputy Lovell further testified that he never saw Ms. Lewis exceeding the posted
speed limit, either before she initially turned off the road or during his subsequent
observation of Ms. Lewis' car while he was following her.

(Tr., p.47, Ls.2-14.)

Ms. Lewis' registration for the car was current, none of the required equipment on the
car appeared to be malfunctioning, none of her windows were obstructed or too
darkened, and the officer did not observe any suspicious movement within her car.
(Tr., p.48, L.15 - p.50, L.21.) The road on which Ms. Lewis was driving before being
pulled over had curves and bends at the points where the officer saw her car allegedly
skirt onto the fog line, and further had deformities in the road's surface that Deputy
Lovell testified could affect a person's ability to drive. (Tr., p.47, L.20 - p.48, L.5.) None
of the identified instances of Ms. Lewis' car moving onto the fog line were abrupt or
jerking swerves to the left or to the right. (Tr., p.47, L.15 - p.48, L. 11.) When Ms. Lewis
had re-entered traffic after pulling over briefly, she did so after signaling appropriately
with the turn signal lights on her car. (Tr., p.53, Ls.15-17.) She did not spin her tires or
in any other way indicate that she was attempting to flee from the officer when she reentered traffic prior to later being pulled over. (Tr., p.53, Ls.18-23.)
Deputy Lovell was the sole witness for the State at this hearing. At the close of
his testimony, the district court invited the parties to submit briefing regarding the
suppression motion - and, in particular, to submit briefing as to whether there was a
lawful basis to stop Ms. Lewis' car based upon her having stuck her arm out of her car
window and having crossed the fog line. (Tr., p.65, L.14 - p.66, L.15.)
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Following the hearing on her motion to suppress, Ms. Lewis filed a brief and
memorandum of authorities with the district court in support of her suppression motion.
(R., pp.62-79.) In this brief, Ms. Lewis asserted that the officer who initiated the traffic
stop lacked either probable cause or reasonable, articulable suspicion to do so.
(R., pp.69-78.) This is because, according to Ms. Lewis, none of the bases set forth by
Deputy Lovell provided a basis to believe that any traffic laws were actually violated, nor
did they, in the aggregate, show any impaired driving. (R., pp.69-78.)
The district court denied Ms. Lewis' motion to suppress. (R., pp.88-95.) Among
the bases for the court doing so was the court's conclusion

quoting directly from case

law - that the act of crossing onto or over the fog line on a roadway constitutes a traffic
offense. The district court reasoned that, because Deputy Lovell had actually witnessed
Ms. Lewis commit a traffic offense, he had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop her
vehicle. (R., pp.92-93.) In light of this fact, and under the totality of the circumstances
known to Deputy Lovell at the time of the stop, the district court denied Ms. Lewis'
motion to suppress. (R., p.95.)
Thereafter, Ms. Lewis entered into a conditional guilty plea to felony driving under
the influence, specifically reserving the right to challenge on appeal the denial of her
motion to suppress.

(Tr., p.68, L.4 - p.81, L.13; R., pp.99-104, 109.)

She was

sentenced to six years, with three years fixed, based upon her guilty plea. (Tr., p.93,
Ls.9-14; R., pp.111-114.) Ms. Lewis then filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion
seeking a reduction of her sentence. (Tr., p.96, L.4 - p.98, L.7; R., pp.117-120.) The
district court did modify her sentence pursuant to this motion, reducing the fixed portion
of her sentence to two years, with four years indeterminate. (Tr., p.97, L.11 - p.98, L.4.)
Ms. Lewis timely appeals from her judgment of conviction and sentence. (R., p.122.)
4

ISSUE
Mindful of the fact that crossing over or onto the fog line on a roadway constitutes a
traffic infraction, did the district court err when it denied Ms. Lewis' motion to suppress
the State's evidence?
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ARGUMENT
Mindful Of The Fact That Crossing The Fog Line On A Roadway Constitutes A Traffic
Infraction, Ms. Lewis Nevertheless Asserts That The District Court Erred When It
Denied Ms. Lewis' Motion To Suppress The State's Evidence
Ms. Lewis' sole challenge in her motion to suppress the State's evidence was to
whether there was sufficient legal justification to support Ms. Lewis' detention by Deputy
Lovell when he pulled her over. (Tr., p.18, L.1 - p.20, L.7.) Among the bases upon
which the district court determined that there was reasonable, articulable suspicion to
support the initial stop of Ms. Lewis' car for a traffic violation was evidence presented
through Deputy Lovell's testimony that her car crossed onto and over the fog line on the
roadway several times. (R., pp.92-93.)
The Fourth Amendment permits limited detentions of individuals, such as those
which occur during a traffic stop, if the officer who seizes the individual possesses
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a
crime. See, e.g., State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 298 (Ct. App. 2001 ). In the context of
a traffic stop, this standard amounts to whether, based upon the totality of the
circumstances at the time of the stop, the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the traffic laws were being violated. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 552,
554 (Ct. App. 2000).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has previously addressed the question of whether
even a fleeting crossing of the fog line constitutes a traffic violation that would support a
finding of reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop in Slater.
Idaho Code§ 49-630(1) requires that a vehicle be driven on the right half
of the roadway, except in certain circumstances that are not applicable in
this case. The "roadway" means that portion of a highway that is
"improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel." It does not
include "sidewalks, shoulders, berms [or] rights-of-way." Accordingly,
6

when Officer Burns observed Slater's tires cross the fog line, albeit
fleetingly, Burns now possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion that
Slater had violated I.C. § 49-630 by driving on the shoulder of the
highway, rather than on the "roadway."
Slater, 136 Idaho at 298 (internal citations omitted); see also Anderson, 134 Idaho at

554-555 (holding the same).
Mindful of the fact that Ms. Lewis' sole challenge in her motion to suppress was
to the lawfulness of Deputy Lovell's act of stopping her vehicle upon observing her
veering onto and over the fog line several times while driving, and mindful of the fact
that the act of crossing onto or over the fog line is a traffic violation, Ms. Lewis
nevertheless asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
motion to suppress the State's evidence in this case.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Lewis respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction
and sentence, and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 1ih day of November, 2011.
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